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ABSTRACT 
In Malawi, fishing community user groups known as beach village 
committees, traditional chiefs, government officers, and fishers are the 
key players in fisheries management. Fish catch trends at the Elephant 
Marsh Fishery in southern Malawi are declining. Based on interviews 
and participant observation, this article uses an actor-based frame-
work (known as Action-in-Context) to unveil the issues that are crucial 
in devising a sustainable governance system for the fishery. We 
establish and propose that the key social variables for the design of a 
three-pillared (locally based, weak, and amorphous) resilient institu-
tion for sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery are (i) the social 
reputation of the leaders of local fishery institutions (beach village 
committee leaders), and (ii) the power dynamics between traditional 
chiefs and these local fishery leaders. We end the article by exploring 
the implications of the findings on the sustainability of the fishery 
under rising resource pressure. 
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The Elephant Marsh, a wetland in the southern part of Malawi, is important for small-scale 
fisheries (SSF). The wetland is located on the East African Rift Valley floor and covers an 
average area of about 600 km2, varying between 2,700 km2 in the wet season and 500 km2 
in the dry season. The marsh is fed by the Shire River, the only outlet of Lake Malawi, 
which flows through it in a southerly direction before joining the Zambezi River in 
Mozambique. The marsh has relatively grassy margins but the bulk of its surface is formed 
by a mosaic of rooted swamp vegetation (sudd), floating vegetation, and open water. The 
Elephant Marsh is home to several species of fish, out of which Clarias gariepinus (locally 
known as mlamba), Oreochromis mossambicus (makakana or mphende), Oreochromis 
placidus (makumba), and Barbus ssp. (matemba) comprise more than 90% of the 
commercial catch (World Bank 2010). The annual fish production from around the 
Elephant Marsh has been estimated at about 8,500 tonnes. There are no recent scientific 
data on the trends of fisheries exploitation at the Elephant Marsh, but fishers generally feel 
the catch per unit effort (CPUE) is slowly decreasing (Kosamu 2014). Based on a 2014 
survey by Malawi’s Department of Fisheries (DoF) there are about 1,500 fishers at the 
Elephant Marsh. 
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The Elephant Marsh Fishery is mainly guided by customary law through village chiefs 
who receive their mandate through inheritance, and is managed by user groups called 
“Beach Village Committees” (BVCs), which are headed by chairpersons (BVC Chairs). 
Village chiefs are given ex officio (nonvoting) roles as patrons of the BVCs (Russell and 
Dobson 2011). The term “beach” stands for a fish landing site: sandy or swampy (as at 
the Elephant Marsh). They are connected to one fishing village each. The Beach Chair 
and the other members of the BVC (usually composed of 10 office bearers) are elected 
directly into their positions through local democracy at a village meeting for a 2-year 
renewable term. Villagers eligible to vote are mainly those who are involved in fishing 
activities, such as fishers and fish traders. At the Elephant Marsh Fishery, fish traders 
are also locally known as angoni, broadly meaning foreigner and, specifically for this 
fishery, someone from outside the circle of the fishing villages at the Elephant Marsh 
(although Angoni also refers to an ethnic group in Malawi), and are not allowed to fish. 
The concept of BVCs was introduced in Malawi in 1991 as a government initiative 
under the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (PFMP) in response to declin-
ing fish catches at Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire River (Lewins et al. 2014). Since then 
BVCs have been adopted at the national level and supported by the National Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Policy (NFAP) (Government of Malawi 2001) as a participatory link between 
the Department of Fisheries (DoF) and the fishing communities. 
Although the Elephant Marsh can be characterized as a single ecosystem, the mosaic 
landscape has led to fragmentation of the open water into several smaller “lakes,” which 
are managed independently at the fishing village (beach) level. Currently there is no overall 
fisheries management association to coordinate the operations of the BVCs (Kosamu 
2014). Bavinck (2005) reported that the actions of fishers in one part of such SSF systems 
often affect those of others in a different location of the same system. Indeed, migration is a 
common feature among fishers at the Elephant Marsh. Fishers periodically migrate to 
beaches where the catch is better than their home village, often for short stays with no 
intentions of permanent shift. The phenomenon has also been observed in other parts 
of Africa (Nunan 2010). 
Studies on the Elephant Marsh fishery are limited. Evidence from a study by Kosamu 
et al. (2012) shows that the locally based management system at Elephant Marsh is working 
well. These findings are consistent with Bavinck’s (1996) assertion that local decision- 
making structures in fishing communities are capable of implementing regulatory actions 
toward what is perceived as a common good. However, due to background developments 
such as population growth, rural poverty, climate change, and market forces, the exploi-
tation pressure on the already declining fish catches at the Elephant Marsh Fishery is likely 
to increase, and achieving sustainability in the near future may require more resilient 
institutions than those that are now at work. 
Another study by Kosamu (2014) reveals that the quality of leadership of the local fish-
eries committee (BVC Chairs) seems to be a prime factor for a well-managed Elephant 
Marsh Fishery. With Kosamu’s (2014) revelation as a premise, this article first addresses 
issues that relate to the actions and motivations of fishers at the Elephant Marsh Fishery 
and then moves on with a similar analysis to the other key actors such as BVC Chairs, 
village leaders, and government fisheries officers. The article aims at unveiling a short-term 
management design for the Elephant Marsh Fishery specifically and a type of thinking that 
maybe fruitful to institutional science in general. 
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Methodology 
Methodological Framework 
In this article we follow an actor-based approach (as opposed to a more systems-oriented 
approach) that identifies the roles of all actors connected to the fishery (e.g., fishers or 
government officers) and the institutions that underlie the action of the actors (Hobbes 
et al. 2007). This is consonant with our desire to trace social causation, because actors, 
not systems, are the social entities that can act and thereby effect changes (Anderies, 
Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). The approach does not deny the importance of social systems. 
Obviously, as Latour (2005) puts it, the social connections that an actor has with different 
networks determine what the actor is, wants, and can do. The social networks have actually 
been found to influence actors’ behavior in natural resources management (Bodin and 
Crona 2009). In this article, we use the “Action-in-Context” framework (AiC) as devised 
by De Groot (1992) to identify all the major actors, their potential to act (comprising their 
active capacity and motivation to act), and their actions’ causal linkages before identifying 
the overall patterns of social causation that emerge. Action-in-Context (AiC) is an actor- 
based framework inspired by such authors as Vayda (1983), Vayda and Walters (1999), 
and Elster (1989), designed to facilitate the tracing of multi-actor and multilevel social 
causation. 
The domain of AiC can be defined as “sufficiently deliberative action.” This then 
excludes habitual or purely emotional or physical behaviors, as well as people’s relatively 
deep “life choices” or commitments, which are shaped by an actor’s values (Song and 
Chuenpagdee 2011). Thus, our assumption in this study is that small-scale fisheries man-
agement is sufficiently deliberative to allow for valid description in a broad and culturally 
sensitive rational choice approach. This is comparable to, for instance, Ostrom’s (1990) 
application of broad rational choice to resource management where actors collectively 
achieve intended results through constrained purposeful action by building conditions 
for reciprocity, trust, and reputation that help to overcome strong temptations of short- 
term self-interest of the individual actors (Ostrom 1998a). The rational choice approach 
asserts that all individual actors are able to learn rules and norms, and how to craft new 
rules to improve an achieved outcome (which in our case is an improved management 
system for the Elephant Marsh Fishery). 
The core element of AiC is a triangular causal structure that expresses that in order to 
act, the actor needs both the motivation (“desire,” “will,” etc.) and the option (“opport-
unity,” “autonomy,” “power,” etc.) to do so. In this article we look at power as a relational 
construct and define it as the level of cost incurred if one unilaterally withdraws from a 
relationship (Crona and Bodin 2010). Thus, a low cost of withdrawal means high power 
and vice versa. In Figure 1 the triangular causal structure of the actor, action, and imple-
mentable options and motivations is illustrated with terms added from our fisheries case at 
the Elephant Marsh. Typically for AiC, implementable options and motivations are 
depicted as separate from each other, despite the fact that on a deeper level they are inter-
dependent. For instance, people do not usually continue to have desires for what they know 
they can never get (options), while on the other hand persistent desires can build capacity 
on a longer run. Thus, AiC enables clear and comprehensive causal mapping of ongoing 
interactions, without denying that more interpretative methods might be needed to 
understand longer-term change. 
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From the causal triangle onward, AiC proceeds in two analytical directions. The first is 
depicted in Figure 1, and called “deeper analysis,” connecting as it does the actor’s imple-
mentable options and motivations to their underlying social phenomena. In Figure 1, for 
instance, the BVC Chair’s motivation to maintain his social reputation embeds his actions 
in the BVC (“microstructure”). The “implementable options” of the actor are built from 
“autonomy” or “capacity” composed of institutions, rules, financial or private social capital 
(personal benefits that actors derive from their social networks) (Kostova and Roth 2003), 
and “potential options.” The difference between “potential options” and “implementable 
options” lies in what the actor can really do in the active world as opposed to what the actor 
could do if presented with greater capacities. “Motivations” are all aspects of the options 
under normative consideration by the actors in their choice of action. They can be sepa-
rated analytically as “objectified motivations” and “interpretations.” “Objectified 
Figure 1. The structure of AiC “deeper analysis” with a few items from the study area filled in. The BVC 
Chair’s action of gear restriction is the explanandum from which the analysis works its way downward. 
Arrows indicate the causal direction.  
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motivations” are the quantifiable demerits of the action, for example, in terms of money or 
calories. Actions of decision makers in fisheries management are often influenced by such 
quantitative motivations, but on the other hand, more culturally embedded qualifications 
of costs and benefits can be important too; these are called “interpretations” in AiC. “Inter-
pretations” relate to the Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson (1958) overview of human 
motivations, which are material inducements (money or goods); opportunities for distinc-
tion, prestige, and personal power; desirable conditions of work, such as cleanliness; pride 
in workmanship; service for family or others; patriotism or religious feeling; personal com-
fort and satisfaction in social relationships; conformity to habitual practices and attitudes; 
and a feeling of participation in important events. These basic individual motivations and 
values have also been reported by Schwartz et al. (2012) in a more detailed assessment. 
The second analytical direction for tracing of causal linkages in AiC connects the action- 
to-be explained to actions of other actors, specifying the “actor’s field” that links the actor 
(e.g., BVC chair) to secondary actors such as the village chief, fishers, and government 
officers (Figure 2), through intermediary actions. The BVC Chair’s actions are influenced 
by other actors that act upon the motivations or options for a particular action. When 
identified, these “actors of influence,” such as the village chief or government, are referred 
to as secondary actors. (Note that what is called primary, secondary, etc. here is only a 
matter of counting, not denoting empirical or normative importance.) From there on, it 
is easy to identify causal linkages with the next, tertiary layer of “actors of influence.” 
Thus, we see that the actor’s field concept deeply differs from social networks that 
appear to be the only inter-actors concept guiding the social sciences. Broadly put, social 
networks are structures related to how actors shape institutions (collective action), while 
actors’ fields describe how institutions shape the actions of the actors (Hobbes et al. 2007). 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection was undertaken between March and June 2014. Interviews, focus-group 
discussions, and observations were done at 24 fishing villages at the Elephant Marsh with 
fishers (n ¼ 240), BVC Chairs (n ¼ 24), village leaders (n ¼ 24), fisheries officers (n ¼ 6), 
and district and national fisheries officials (n ¼ 10). Secondary data were obtained from 
such sources as government databases, reports, journals, and Internet articles. 
Some of the questions for each of the four key actors at the Elephant Marsh Fishery 
included: What are the actions of the key actor? What capacities and motivations (costs 
and benefits/incentives) explain these actions? Which institutions or structures underlie 
the key actor’s motivations and capacities? How are the actions of the key actor influenced 
by the other key actors? What are the capacities and motivations of these other key actors 
who have an influence on the actions of the key actor in question? What are the main social 
causalities, dynamics, and mechanisms among these key actors? A social causation map 
(Glaser 2006) emerging from answers to these questions helped in tracing the key factors 
and actors that are essential in crafting institutions that could be central in achieving 
sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery under increasing pressure but that also help 
institutional designers in small-scale fisheries. This is particularly important because, as 
Ostrom (1992) highlights, an institution is “the set of rules-in-use by a set of individuals 
to self-organize repetitive activities that produce outcomes affecting those individuals 
and potentially affecting others” (19). 
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As the answers to these questions were sought, it was also important to bear in mind 
that some of the pressures that exist at the Elephant Marsh may require some ecological 
thinking, too. Our focus on sociocausal linkages had a reason: Any solution (whether 
ecologically or socially based) requires social embedding (Cleaver 2002) to work at all. 
The interviews were guided by AiC schemas and the concept of “sustainability,” which 
was discussed in terms of catches going down persistently or fishers leaving the beach for 
other beaches. Interview responses were progressively synthesized into AiC schema during 
field data collection. Participant observation helped verify interactions between actors, the 
Figure 2. Summary of an actors’ field for the Elephant Marsh Fishery. Below each actor category, the 
boxes indicate the options and motivations leading to the actor’s actual action. Actors are linked 
through actions that influence options and/or motivations of other actors.  
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market prices, and size of catches, main fish species, and the legality of the fishing gear 
used, among other attributes. The resulting AiC schemas were then progressively inter-
preted and synthesized into a number of narratives that focused on key themes. For an 
example of a characteristic AiC schema result, see Figure 2, which takes a BVC Chair as 
a primary actor and shows how the motivations and options of other key actors influence 
the BVC Chair’s actions in the management of the Elephant Marsh Fishery. 
In the presentation of the study findings, we focus on the resultant narrative themes, 
which are organized based on the main actors as highlighted in Figure 2. 
Results 
This section reports on the causal narratives (themes) that emerged from the AiC analysis 
and starts off with the fishers. 
Livelihood Support and Reputation Motivate the Fisher 
This study found that most of the families (>70%) at the Elephant Marsh are poor and 
depend on fish and subsistence wetland agriculture for their livelihood. Table 1 
summarizes the basic cost and benefits at the Elephant Marsh. It is evident from the table that 
the returns to labor of specialized fishing are much higher (three to four times) than those of 
specialized wetland rice farming. Moreover, rice farming is feasible only in one season. This is 
an important background for interpretation of our fisheries data. People do not have access to 
remunerative options besides fisheries, for instance, and reputation in fishing activities 
corresponds to a large extent to reputation at the village level (“interpretations” in Figure 1). 
It is also interesting to note that an annual net income of roughly US$3,000 (Table 1) for 
an average fishing household of five persons (National Statistics Office (NSO) 2008) translates 
to US$1.6 per day, which is just below the new global poverty line recommendation of US$1.9 
(World Bank 2015). 
Fishers indicated that being able to support a family with food and basic income 
(“objectified motivations” in Figure 1) brings pride and social acceptance in the village 
(“interpretations”). Social reputation is also enhanced by good citizenship as displayed, 
Table 1. Return to labor (US$ per working day) for the two main livelihood activities at the Elephant 
Marsh, using estimates of the most commonly occurring cost and benefit figures. 
Item Wetland rice farming Fishing  
1. Labour investment 70 days/ha/yr 300 days/yr 
2. Inputs (i) Rice seeds: 40 kg/ha �
US$0.7/kg ¼ US$28 
(i) Cost of a dugout canoe ¼ US$177 every  
7 years ¼ US$25/yr 
(ii) Fertilizer (urea): 50 kg/ha �
US$0.8/kg ¼ US$40 
(ii) Fishing licence fee ¼ US$0.9/yr 
Total inputs ¼ US$68/yr (iii) Gill net (100 m) ¼ US$0.4 � 100 ¼ US$40/yr  
Total inputs ¼ US$66/yr 
3. Annual  
harvest/catch 
1,000 kg/ha/yr 10 kg per day (11 kg is usually caught and about 1 kg is  
given to village chief as tribute) � 300 days/yr ¼ 3,000 kg/yr 
4. Market price US$0.3 /kg US$1.12 /kg 
5. Gross income 1,000 � US$0.3 ¼ 300 US$/yr 3,000 � US$1.12 ¼ 3,360 US$/yr 
6. Net income US$238/yr U$3,294/yr 
7. Return to labor US$3/working day US$11/working day 
Note. The estimates are based on assumption of 8 working hours per day, 300 working days per year (i.e., no sickness or 
other major problems), and that there no other economic activities for the rest of the year.    
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for instance, by reciprocating trust, participating in communal work, funerals, and other 
activities, and refraining from illegal actions such as breaking fisheries bylaws. 
Reputation is the Key for the BVC Chair 
The capacity and motivation of BVC chairs to implement the local fisheries rules are pivotal 
for the fishery at the Elephant Marsh to work. In this section, we first discuss the rules, the 
BVC Chair’s motivations, and finally their implementation capacity. According to Ostrom 
(1992), rules work well when “every participant knows the rules, knows that others know the 
rules, and knows that others also know that the participant knows the rules” (20). The rules- 
in-use by the actors are therefore not always the written by-laws or indeed the legislative 
provisions or court regulations (Ostrom 1992) but self-modified versions of the written 
rules. In the same vein, some respondents lamented that social complexities at village level 
can make it difficult to impose sanctions against offending fishers, as narrated by one BVC 
Chair: “We wish we could confiscate gear but looking at our local situation [poverty in the 
village], we feel sorry and just forgive each other.” In some cases implementation of the rules 
was lacking because of fear for cultural beliefs (witchcraft), as revealed from the following 
response: “This village is not united; if you offend someone [confiscate their fishing gear] 
they can ‘create’ crocodiles which can kill you when you go fishing.” 
When asked if BVC Chairs had the capacity to restrict the number of new (non-angoni) 
fishers coming to a beach, most respondents thought it is impossible to implement that 
provision. The BVC Chair at Mchachajemusi said: “It is possible to regulate fishing gear, 
regulate timing and to deny access to angoni, but new fishers from local villages are always 
welcome because in our culture it is a taboo to exclude own people. There is no way to keep 
these new fishers away. … Not even the chief, the government, or the president can do 
that.” The BVC chair at Chisamba, which is one of the beaches with good fish catches, 
indicated the beach had many fishers and new ones kept coming; the BVC counteracts this 
immigration pressure by implementing an annual semiclosed season between January 1 
and March 31 during which it is strictly not allowed to use certain gear such as seine nets. 
The BVC Chair further suggested that in the future they may have to control how much 
each fisher catches, so that everyone has equal access. 
Besides managing their own beaches, BVC Chairs also display a degree of interbeach 
coordination. With a focus on maintaining social order, BVC Chairs write transfer letters 
for outgoing fishers and demand the same from fishers coming to their beach. They also 
make phone calls to inform one another about troublesome fishers such as boat thieves. 
An example of sustainability-oriented coordination is that the beaches of Nsambokulira, 
Twaya, Bwemba, Chuluchamkango, and Mchachajemusi jointly maintain a ban on kumba 
nets (under-meshed gill nets originating from Mozambique). Indicative of the weak power 
of such agreements is that some beaches that are party to the agreement (like Bwemba and 
Twaya) are currently not implementing the ban. 
From our analysis, at almost all beaches with good fish catches, the implementation of 
bylaws by the BVC Chair was adhered to. In the interviews, one BVC Chair attributed their 
capacity to manage beaches well to personal reputation: “When the affairs at the beach are 
being managed well, people give me a lot of respect.” As Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young 
(2009) observe, personal reputation is a social capital, which is built through social 
networks by repeated trustworthy interactions between actors. The fungibility of this capital 
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was noted, for example, in that with any failure of a BVC Chair to resolve conflicts or keep 
outsiders out, or if fishers move away from the beach due to low catches, the other villagers 
may consider that as a weakness and the BVC Chair may become a subject of village gossip, 
leading to overall loss of reputation. Thus, failure to implement bylaws invokes the 
breakdown of reputation, which then further reduces the BVC Chair’s capacity to act. 
When asked about how they resolve conflicts, all respondents (BVC Chairs, village chiefs, 
and fishers) said conflict resolution starts from the BVC Chair, who may refer more serious 
offenses to the village chief, police, or courts (in that order), depending on the gravity of 
an issue at hand. None of the respondents mentioned the Department of Fisheries (DoF) 
as a legitimate player in conflict resolution. Of course, the DoF with support from the chiefs 
has the legitimate power, for example, to seize illegal gear under sections 30 and 32 of the 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FMCA) (Government of Malawi 1997), but 
the mandate to resolve conflicts and destroy seized items is vested in customary law and, if 
need be, the criminal law courts. Our analysis of conflict resolution revealed that while the 
BVC Chairs and village chiefs tend to be motivated to resolve the conflicts because 
they want to protect their reputation and possibly get some other benefits (e.g., fines), 
the motivation (both “objectified motivations” and “interpretations”) of the police and 
courts is very weak because there is no direct incentive for them from the fishery. 
All BVC Chairs in our sample acknowledged that the village chief is an important source 
of BVC Chair’s power and legitimacy without whose support things fall apart. For example, 
we identified a case at one beach in which the chief did not want to support the BVC Chair 
and the tension resulted in a physical fight, finally adjudicated by court. The BVC Chair of 
the concerned beach had this to say: 
Some chiefs are just difficult for no reason. Our chief here was threatening me that I had no 
power to tell the fishers what they should be doing. He even threatened the officer from the 
DoF that he would ban the officer from coming to this village. I was not happy and we fought. 
The case was referred to police and the court. I won the case and now he [the chief] is a bit 
quiet. … But still I feel that if we are to implement new strategies at this beach, like the coor-
dination with other beaches, then the chief has a final say. In the end, I can only implement 
what the chief has approved. He owns the beach; I only oversee the fisheries but this village has 
other issues too not just fish, so in that respect I have lesser power than him. Otherwise it may 
lead to a situation where the chief will say that I “have stepped on his head.” Actually, I am 
sure that the situation is similar in other beaches.  
What then would the BVC Chair’s motivation be to maintain these rules? This question 
is pertinent because the BVC chairmanship is not remunerated by salary or a regular local 
contribution. Consequently, the BVC Chair has to go fishing just like the other fishers, in 
addition to doing the work connected to the chairmanship. We established that one incen-
tive for the BVC Chairs is that they are occasionally invited for seminars by the DoF. Social 
reputation is, however, the major motivation for the BVC Chair, as often repeated in the 
interviews. Capacity to do the job of the BVC Chair effectively creates reputation, which in 
the background is backed by formal law through sections 7 and 8(1) of the FMCA. We see 
this backing mostly at work in conflict resolution and gear restriction. 
Power Relations Between the Village Chief and BVC Chair are the Key Dynamic 
The previous section has already made it clear that besides the BVC Chair, village chiefs are 
holding a powerful position in the Elephant Marsh Fishery; see also Lewins et al. (2014) 
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and Russell and Dobson (2011). Our interviews with fishers, village chiefs, and BVC Chairs 
at the Elephant Marsh revealed four roles of chiefs in the small-scale fishery, as follows: 
(i) A BVC Chair cannot accept a new fisher without first asking for consent from the village 
chief. (ii) The BVC Chair cannot call for a meeting for fishers and other stakeholders such 
as fish traders without seeking approval from the village chief. (iii) The village chief has 
power to evict or fine (under customary law) a community member who is not abiding 
by village norms. (iv) The chief supports the BVC, for example, by safeguarding confiscated 
gear; as one chief put it, “When BVC Chairs confiscate illegal fishing gear, they pass it on to 
me for safe-keeping until the government officers come for handover. We work together 
well.” It may therefore be asserted that by (dis)approving new fishers, the village chief helps 
to keep the membership of a fishing community in check. 
We also established that the main motivation for the village chiefs is a weekly fish tribute 
that they receive from fishers (channeled through the BVC Chair) as part of their catch. 
Usually this amounts to some 5 kg of fish per beach per week with a monetary value of 
about US$6/week. This amount would be higher if a village chief would allow many fishers 
at the beach but the fish catches would eventually decline as a result of an increased num-
ber of fishers and the tribute to the village chief would consequently decrease in value. Our 
analysis has also shown that if the village chief received his weekly fish tribute as scheduled, 
it was an indicator that the BVC Chairs and the fishers had trust in his or her leadership 
and legitimacy. In such trustworthy setups, the chief almost always supported the BVC 
leadership and there were usually no power struggles or conflicts with other stakeholders. 
In principle, this can only happen if the fish catches are good, which is probably a reason 
why the village chief was almost always supportive of the BVC Chair in villages that had 
good fish catches. 
The Department of Fisheries (DoF) and State-Based Sustainability Rules 
A point frequently voiced by respondents was that the DoF plays a role in influencing com-
munity attitudes and behavior toward fisheries management as stated by one fisher: “When 
they [DoF officers] come here, they teach us about good fishing practices but sometimes 
they confiscate illegal fishing gear.” It is well known in Malawi that the government officers 
who are entrusted with the implementation of the state’s fisheries management programs 
have low salaries (Anders 2009), in addition to facing numerous other challenges in getting 
the resources they need for their job. Our analysis therefore found it unreasonable to expect 
the government officers to sanction offenders of fisheries regulations or not be tempted to 
accept petty handouts in the form of fish or money. It was not surprising consequently to 
observe that those government officers often take no action against fishers who are using 
illegal gear. For example, in one case a fisheries assistant exhibited deliberate “closure of his 
eyes” and had this to say during a walk around a beach: “Yes indeed, we can see lots of 
juveniles in the catch here and on the fish drying racks, but that is OK because today is 
not my official visiting day for this beach.” 
Apart from the low salaries, it was also established that the extra challenges faced by 
DoF officers include the poor status of the roads leading to the beaches, lack of trust 
between government officers and village chiefs, high rates of illiteracy among fishers 
making it difficult to share information, inadequate resources for operations including lack 
of transport, and the differences in by-laws between BVCs, making it difficult to regulate 
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because fishers move to beaches that have weaker rules, which often results in localized 
overfishing. 
The Central Government and Policies for Conflict Resolution 
The AiC analysis established a weak causal relationship between the central government 
and what actually happens in the Elephant Marsh fishery at present. For instance, DoF 
officers conduct surveys annually to check the legality of fishing gear and establish the total 
number of fishers. We particularly pay attention to the central government here because 
it is responsible for formulating policies that are deemed necessary for sustainable 
management of fisheries resources at national level. 
The law governing fishing matters is contained in the FMCA, the Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Regulations (Government of Malawi 2000a), and the Fisheries Conser-
vation and Management Rules (Government of Malawi 2000b). Under the FMCA, a 
BVC does not have power to suspend or cancel a fishing license granted by the DoF but 
may merely make a recommendation to the DoF to that effect. This provision reduces 
the de jure ability of the BVC chair to effectively manage fishers who are capable of paying 
the license fee to the DoF but fail to follow the bylaws at a fishing village. The status quo at 
the Elephant Marsh in which respected BVC chairs do have the de facto capacity to 
implement the bylaws is another proof of the disjoint between policy and localized reality. 
Toward an Empirically Based Management Institution: Modest, Local, and 
Amorphous 
The purpose of this section is to explore the principles of an institution that could help 
safeguard the sustainability of the Elephant Marsh fishery based on the empirical findings 
presented here. These findings are well suited for the institutional design goal, since the 
AiC framework has a causal orientation, which is paramount to the design of an effective 
solution (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). 
Many institutional design theories and frameworks are available in the context of 
fisheries management. One is the set of empirically based institutional design rules 
of Ostrom (1990) and Cox, Arnold, and Tomás (2010). Another, more normative basis is 
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 1998b; Imperial 
and Yandle 2005), which focuses on a specific activity (action arena), the people who take 
part in the activity (actors), and their patterns of interaction that affect the resulting 
outcome (Whaley and Weatherhead 2014). The emphasis of the IAD framework on the 
patterns of interaction between actors is important in designing a relevant “action arena” 
for the Elephant Marsh Fishery. The IAD framework has been a reference point for later 
propositions such as that of Pahl-Wostl (2007), who proposes social learning for adaptive 
management. Adaptive capacity (the ability of the actors to live with changing external 
drivers such as market forces) has been found to be a critical determinant of institutional 
resilience (Aguilera et al. 2015). Indeed, if a new management system is designed for the 
Elephant Marsh Fishery, the ability of actors to live with change will be crucial for the resili-
ence of the resultant institution. Our institutional design here is data based but pays close 
reference to the principles of Ostrom (1990), which were reviewed by Cox, Arnold, and 
Tomás (2010), and much akin to the “grounded theory” of Glaser and Strauss (2009). 
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We initially put the general institutional theory and design frameworks between the brackets 
and let the data speak for themselves, without letting this voice be “colonized” (Cheney and 
Weston 1999) by the conceptual classifications and normative criteria of the theories and 
frameworks. Thereafter we relate our data-based propositions with design rules of Ostrom 
(1990) and Cox, Arnold, and Tomás (2010) such as “nested enterprises” (rules at each of the 
fishing villages at the Elephant Marsh should be nested within the rules at the scale of the 
whole fishery), “collective choice arrangements” (the majority of actors at the Elephant 
Marsh Fishery should have the autonomy to formulate rules), “congruence with local 
conditions” (locally crafted fishing rules should be present), “monitoring” (BVCs with sup-
port from other actors should have the responsibility to monitor the resource), “graduated 
sanctions” (there should be application of varied sanctions to offenders depending on sever-
ity and frequency of violation), and “conflict resolution mechanism” (locally acceptable 
adjudication should be available within the fishing community at Elephant Marsh). By 
nature, theories and frameworks easily resonate with the vision of good institutions in that 
both aim to be coherent, logical, and generic. Blending the “grounded theory” way with the 
design principles of design rules of Ostrom (1990) and Cox, Arnold, and Tomás (2010) may 
be not only appropriate for the Elephant Marsh Fishery but also an experiment of more 
general value for institutional science; it invites us out of the box, discovering that pillars 
for good institutions may sometimes also, in a way and to some extent, be of low cost, 
purely locally crafted, and amorphous (internally unstructured). 
Pillar 1: A Low-Cost Institution Built for Growth and Adaptation 
Fish catch data at the Elephant Marsh Fishery are scarce but signs are that real overfishing 
does take place locally in the marsh’s mosaic, as indicated by the temporary migration of 
fishers to beaches where they get higher catches and these beaches’ BVC Chairs taking 
action by crafting local fishing rules of closed seasons and regulated gear. The “graduated 
sanctions” contained in the operational rules are now seen to slowly grow “upward” as 
“collective choice arrangements” in two senses: spatially from a local to a supralocal level 
through interbeach coordination, and institutionally from informal personal rule to formal 
rule of (local) law. In congruence with the local conditions, virtually all of our respondents 
agreed that some sort of really supralocal institution, on the clearly defined boundaries of 
the Elephant Marsh, could be helpful. The question then becomes: helpful to do what? 
What should be the mandate and “action arena” of such an institution that could link 
up with currently felt needs? From our data, four functions come to mind: (i) strengthening 
of the ongoing process of inter-BVC coordination, (ii) implementation of a simple, people- 
based marsh-wide monitoring system, integrating the locally available informal data on 
catches and catch per unit effort (CPUE), (iii) discussing a self-organized but yet more 
cost-effective relationship with the government (Ostrom’s 1990 minimum recognition of 
rights to organize), which could, for instance, motivate fisheries officers to “open their 
eyes,” and (iv) informally exploring long-term management strategies using hypothetical 
scenarios, for example, rising population and climate change. These four tasks would create 
an adaptive learning institution preparing itself for growth and action if needed, without 
requiring costly administrative overload. Basically, the current village-level institutions 
are good enough to only require a yearly marsh-wide coordination meeting of, say, 2 days. 
The necessity of such a low-cost institution does not require justification at the local level 
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and could be locally funded. Expressing its modest mandate, it could, for instance, be called 
the Annual Elephant Marsh Fisheries Meeting—not “Board” or “Authority” or anything of 
that weight yet. 
Pillar 2: A Purely Locally Based “Nested Enterprise” 
As we have seen in the third section, rules that work at the Elephant Marsh fishery are both 
locally crafted and locally enforced. Consequently, the weak presence of the state and 
national fisheries policies in the Elephant Marsh may be seen as a benign rather than a 
problematic circumstance. Indeed, the semiquantitative analyses of Kosamu (2014; 2015) 
have shown that on both the level of the Elephant Marsh and that of 17 other cases in 
developing countries, strong local institutions enhance sustainability while any state inter-
ference, whether imposing rules in state-based management or negotiating rules in co- 
management, results in a breakdown of sustainability-enhancing rules. The analysis of this 
article has shown why this may be so. Reputation is both the key motivation and the key 
capacity (power) of the BVC Chairs and the village chiefs. Why would they continue to be 
motivated if they cannot be their “own man” anymore, being degraded to an implementer 
of exotic conflict resolution mechanisms or policeman of external rules? Why would fishers 
listen to such people, given that real state power (courts, fines) is in fact far away? This 
approach can help in understanding how a supralocal institution, leaving local motivations 
and power intact, may create desirable outcomes. This leads to a point where we can visua-
lize a marsh-wide institution as a purely locally based “nested enterprise” sensu Ostrom 
(1990), crafted and governed by the local committees with the same power-sharing struc-
ture as discussed in the third section. According to Kolding, Béné, and Bavinck (2014), 
when such self-governing systems are established, they enjoy greater local legitimacy, parti-
cularly in weak political systems (as is the case in Malawi and most developing countries), 
and therefore stand a better chance of success. 
Pillar 3: An Internally Amorphous Institution 
As highlighted, the power interaction between the BVC Chairs and their village chiefs is the 
key dynamic determining the fate of the fishery at the local level. If they support each 
other’s reputation, the beach will be well managed. However, reputation, being a volatile 
capital, is vulnerable to any emergent conflicts, which can easily result in breakdown of 
rules and subsequent overfishing. It may be noted that at the village level, the relationship 
between a BVC Chair and a village chief, though framed in general cultural traditions and 
metaphors, is primarily personal and not captured in the legal framework or administrative 
logic. It would appear wise to maintain this principle at the supralocal level of the marsh- 
wide institution. Any logical task division between the two groups (e.g., as decision makers 
vs. advisors, decision makers vs. implementers, politics vs. administration) would frame the 
two roles as opposed and/or subordinate to each other, and subsequently bring disunity and 
tensions down to the local level. Therefore, counterintuitive as it may seem, the marsh-wide 
institution should be left internally unstructured, with village chiefs and BVC Chairs 
included without formal specification of their roles to give a chance for self-organization. 
In so doing, the institution does not force Western formats of democracy on the local 
system, which can continue with its own style (Nkhata, Breen, and Abacar 2009) of 
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mixing mandates (hereditary, elected, and legal) with the power mechanisms of reputation. 
This leaves room, for instance, for lessons to be interpreted and transmitted from chiefs 
who successfully manage the power differential with their BVCs and therewith create 
well-managed beaches. In the case of the Elephant Marsh, where all of the four types of 
power relations distinguished by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) are centralized with the chiefs, 
an internally amorphous institution that reproduces the local power setup will ensure that 
the chiefs’ opinions will tend to prevail in the end, but not without due deliberation at the 
level of the fishing community. This does not differ much from the principle of the final 
“primacy of politics” (political power being key in reshaping community needs and the 
economy) in the Western trias politica (Kickert 2001). 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, an actor-based multilevel analysis of rules and other mechanisms 
prevailing in a fishery can help much in designing a cost-effective institution for the near 
future. For the design of longer term institutional options, the assumptions underlying the 
actors-based method (Action-in-Context in our case) become weaker, for example, because 
new types of actors may move in making the BVCs dysfunctional or because actor capa-
cities and motivations become more intertwined. This then necessitates a stronger blend 
and reliance on both theoretically driven institutional frameworks and a flexible process 
of institutional development guided by an adaptive, learning organization. It is our convic-
tion that a sustainable management system for Elephant Marsh Fishery relies on three pil-
lars: a low-cost, weak institution built for growth and adaptation; a purely locally based 
“nested enterprise”; and an internally amorphous institution. In so doing, we hope to have 
unveiled a management design for the Elephant Marsh fishery specifically and a style of 
thinking that may be fruitful for institutional science in general. 
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